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In the United States civil marriages are entered into either ceremonially, by means of 
compliance of the parties with state statutory requirements for marriage, or 
nonceremonially by the parties satisfying the requirements of a common law marriage.  A 
marriage contracted validly, whether by complying with statutory requirements or the 
requirements of a common law marriage, confers the identical rights, responsibilities, and 
privileges on the parties.  
The purpose of this Legislative Guide is to provide an overview of marriage as a civil 
contract imbued with a public interest, and of common law marriage and statutory marriage 
provisions.  The Guide also provides a brief summary of recent developments in marriage 
law. 
II. Marriage Overview. 
A. Institutional Importance of Marriage, Benefits Conferred. 
The United States Supreme Court has noted that "Marriage is one of the 'basic civil 
rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival,"1 that "the right to marry is 
part of the fundamental 'right of privacy' implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause,"2 and has stated the following about marriage: 
 It is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply 
interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society, without which there 
would be neither civilization nor progress.3 
Marriage also has importance under the law because marriage confers a variety of 
rights, privileges, and obligations that are unique to the institution of marriage.  "In short, 
the marriage laws transform a private agreement into a source of significant public benefits 
and protections."4  In 2004, the Government Accounting Office examined the United States 
Code to determine the federal rights, responsibilities, and privileges that were provided to 
married couples.  The study identified a minimum of 1,138 statutes in which marital status 
was a factor.  On the state and federal levels, these rights, privileges, and obligations affect 
areas including family law, taxation, health care law, probate, torts, government benefits 
and programs, private sector benefits, labor law, real estate, bankruptcy, immigration, and 
criminal law.5  In Baker v. State, the Vermont Supreme Court listed the numerous and 
significant benefits and protections incident to the marriage license.6  In Goodridge v. Dept. 
of Public Health,7 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts also listed the variety of 
benefits that flow from marriage, and noted that "the benefits accessible only by way of a 
marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every aspect of life and death."8 
                                            
1 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
2 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978). 
3 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888). 
4 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 883 (Vt. 1999). 
5 The American Bar Association Section of Family Law Working Group on Same-Sex Marriages and Non-marital Unions, A White Paper: 
An Analysis of the Law Regarding Same-sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships,www.abanet.org/family/whitepaper, 16-
17 (2004). 
6 Baker at 883-84. 
7 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
8 Id. at 955. 
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B. Marriage as a State Concern. 
Marriage in the United States is defined by the laws of each of the 50 states.  It is well-
established that "there is no federal law of domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of 
state concern."9 
  Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more to do 
with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always 
been subject to the control of the legislature. . . .10 
 States enjoy exclusive authority over family law . . . because of the fundamental 
role of localism in the federal design.  The theory of localism presented here 
rests on the view that the law of domestic relations necessarily promotes a 
shared moral vision of the good family life . . . .  Legal decision-makers confront 
fundamental questions concerning the meaning of parenthood, the best custodial 
placements for children, the rights and obligations of marriage, the financial 
terms of divorce, and the standards governing foster care and adoption.  In 
answering such questions, state legislatures and courts draw upon community 
values and norms on the meaning of the good life for families and children.11 
C. Marriage as a Fundamental Right, Constitutional Protection. 
While states may impose marriage regulations, because marriage is a fundamental 
right,12 these regulations are subject to constitutional limitations and those regulations that 
significantly interfere with the exercise of marriage are subject to strict scrutiny.   
  By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do not 
mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way to the 
incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny.  
To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with 
decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed 
(citation omitted).   
 . . . . 
 When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a 
fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently 
important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those 
interests.13 
D. Marriage as a Public Contract. 
From the state's perspective, marriage is a contractual relationship between two 
parties that vests the parties with a new legal status.  Unlike other contracts, however, the 
new status created by the marriage contract cannot be terminated at will by the parties, but 
only as provided by the law of the state, thereby making the state a third party to any 
marriage. 
                                            
9 De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956). 
10 Maynard at 205. 
11 Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1787, 1790 (1995). 
12 See Loving at 12, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495-96, 499 (1965), and Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 
678, 685 (1977). 
13 Zablocki at 386-88. 
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 It is also to be observed that, while marriage is often termed by text writers and in 
decisions of courts as a civil contract, generally to indicate that it must be 
founded upon the agreement of the parties, and does not require any religious 
ceremony for its solemnization, it is something more than a mere contract.  The 
consent of the parties is of course essential to its existence, but when the 
contract to marry is executed by the marriage, a relation between the parties is 
created which they cannot change.  Other contracts may be modified, restricted, 
enlarged, or entirely released upon the consent of the parties.  Not so with 
marriage.  The relation once formed, the law steps in and holds the parties to 
various obligations and liabilities.14 
E. Comity and Full Faith and Credit. 
Because marriage laws vary by state, and because society is mobile, the states must 
have means by which to determine whether to recognize a marriage entered into in a 
foreign jurisdiction, while affording the parties certainty and predictability.  In doing so, a 
state must weigh the policies of the forum and foreign state, the states' connections to the 
parties involved, and the justified expectations of the parties. 
Because marriage is a long continuing relationship, there normally is a need that 
its existence be subject to regulation by one law without occasion for repeated 
redetermination of the validity.  Human mobility ought not to jeopardize the 
reasonable expectations of those relying on an assumed family pattern.15 
The common law concept of comity governs the enforcement and effect of foreign 
judgments and statutes.  This is the concept whereby a court of one state or jurisdiction 
gives effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another as a matter of deference and 
respect, not as a matter of obligation.  However, the effect given to such foreign judgments 
and laws is limited by the public policy of the forum state.   
While it is well recognized that the statutes of another state have no 
extraterritorial force, yet rights acquired thereunder will always, in comity, be 
enforced, if not against the public policy of the laws of the state where redress is 
sought.16 
Additionally, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution was 
adopted as a unifying force for the states.  "The function of the  Full Faith and Credit Clause 
is to resolve controversies where state policies differ."17  The Full Faith and Credit Clause 
provides that:  
  Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, 
and judicial Proceedings of every other State.  And the Congress may by general 
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall 
be proved and the Effect thereof.18 
                                            
14 Maynard at 211-12. 
15 Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 921, 963 (April 1998) quoting Eugene F. 
Scoles &  Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws § 3.2 at 432 (2d ed. 1992). 
16 Kingery v. Donnell, 268 N.W. 617, 619-20 (Iowa 1936), quoting Caine v. St. Louis, San Francisco R. Co., 95 So. 876, 877. 
17 Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 553 (1947). 
18 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. 
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In interpreting the application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to state statutes, as 
opposed to judgments, the United States Supreme Court has noted that: 
  It has often been recognized by this Court that there are some limitations 
upon the extent to which a state will be required by the full faith and credit clause 
to enforce even the judgment of another state, in contravention of its own 
statutes or policy (citations omitted). 
  In the case of statutes, the extra-state effect of which Congress has not 
prescribed, where the policy of one state statute comes into conflict with that of 
another, the necessity of some accommodation of the conflicting interests of the 
two states is more apparent . . . . 
  [T]he conflict is to be resolved, not by giving automatic effect to the full faith 
and credit clause, compelling the courts of each state to subordinate its own 
statutes to those of the other, but by appraising the governmental interests of 
each jurisdiction, and turning the scale of decision according to their weight . . . . 
  It follows that not every statute of another state will override a conflicting 
statute of the forum by virtue of the full faith and credit clause . . . .19 
In determining the governmental interest and determining its weight with regard to 
interstate recognition of marriages that contravene the forum state's statutes, states utilize 
choice of law theories, which, with regard to marriage, stem from the common law principle 
that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere.  This notion supports the public 
policy that favors predictability, certainty, and uniformity in protecting the expectations of 
the parties.  
The general rule which exists with an "overwhelming tendency" in the United 
States is to prefer validation of marriages.  Under this rule, marriages will be 
found to be valid if there is any reasonable basis for doing so . . . .  "The 
validation rule confirms the parties' expectations, it provides stability in an area 
where stability (because of children and property) is very important, and it avoids 
the potentially hideous problems that would arise if the legality of a marriage 
varied from state to state."20 
However, exceptions to this general rule have been established and if the state 
determines that it will not recognize the marriage of the foreign jurisdiction, the 
determination is usually based on the concept of marriage evasion, i.e., the concept that 
the parties have circumvented a state's prohibitions relating to marriage by entering into a 
marriage in another state, or is based on being contrary to the public policy of the forum 
state.21 
                                            
19 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 546-48 (1935). 
20 Barbara J. Cox,  Same-Sex Marriage and the Public Policy Exception in Choice-of-law:  Does it Really Exist?, 16 QLR 61, 65-66 citing 
William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Understanding Conflict of Laws S 116 (a) (2d ed. 1993). 
21 Barbara J. Cox, Interstate Validation of Marriages and Civil Unions, Human Rights Magazine, Vol. 30, No. 3, Summer 2003, 
http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/summer03/interstate.html. 
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III. Common Law Marriage. 
A. What Is Common Law Marriage? 
Common law marriage is a relationship which is not solemnized in a ceremonial 
manner, but requires the following: 
 [A] positive mutual agreement, permanent and exclusive of all others, to enter 
into a marriage relationship, cohabitation sufficient to warrant a fulfillment of 
necessary relationship of man and wife, and an assumption of marital duties and 
obligations.22 
The four elements of common law marriage historically have been a combination of 
capacity to enter into a marital contract, present agreement to be married, cohabitation for 
which no specific length of time is required, and the parties holding themselves out as 
husband and wife so that they have a reputation as being married in the community.23 
B. Origination of Common Law Marriage in Europe and England. 
Common law marriage in the United States is based on the informal marriage 
practices of Europe prior to the Reformation.24  As with marriage regulation in general, 
common law marriage provisions reflect the fusion of mainly Roman, Germanic, and 
Christian influences.25  In ancient Roman times and in the Middle Ages prior to the 
expansion of Christianity, marriage was a private contract between families, without benefit 
of intervention by the church or officials of the state.26  Generally, the practices followed in 
entering a marriage included a betrothal in which consent was provided and families 
exchanged pledges and promises, and a wedding ceremony in which the bride was handed 
over to the groom.  Marriages were entered into through the combined effect of the 
agreement of the parties, recognition among the community of the parties as husband and 
wife, and cohabitation of the parties.27 
  It had not been the custom or practice under either Roman, ancient 
Germanic, or medieval secular law to require any form of licensing, registration, 
or public ceremony to legally recognize a marriage . . . .28 
The requirements and prohibitions established by law and custom relative to marriage, 
including those related to age of the parties, marital status of the parties, impediments to 
marriage such as the degrees of consanguinity and affinity within which marriage was 
prohibited, and the type and amount of property exchanged under the marital contract, 
varied over time.  The essential element of a valid marriage, i.e., the condition that made 
the marriage contract binding, also evolved over time. 
During Roman times, consent was the condition essential to a valid marriage.  At first 
this consent was required of the families involved.  Later mutual consent was required of 
                                            
22 Black's Law Dictionary 277 (6th ed. 1990). 
23 Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 Or. L. Rev. 709, 712-713 (1996). 
24 Id. at 718. 
25 Frances Geis & Joseph Geis, Marriage and the Family in the Middle Ages, at 16 (1987). 
26 Id. at 20-21. 
27 Bowman at 718. 
28 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Feminism Historicized:  Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in Contemporary Feminist Jurisprudence, 75 Iowa L. 
Rev. 1135, 1174 (1990). 
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the principals, as signified by the Roman maxim, "Marriage is by consent only."29  "Roman 
marriage custom was in advance of many of its contemporaries in requiring the consent of 
both principals as a condition of a valid marriage, a rule expressed in the legal formula 
Nuptias consensus non concubitus facit (consent, not intercourse, makes marriage)."30  
"The marriage begins with the nuptials or actual wedded life, which gives expression to the 
consensus nuptialis, or mutual will of the parties to be husband and wife . . . ."31 
In the early Middle Ages, among the barbarian or Germanic peoples that arrived in the 
areas populated by the Roman Empire, the condition necessary to a valid marriage was 
consummation of the marriage, which was signified by a morning gift paid to the bride the 
day after the marriage.32 
With the spread of Christianity and through the later Middle Ages, the Roman Catholic 
Church and the canon law promulgated by the church gained influence in determining the 
validity of marriage and were gradually insinuated into the marriage ceremony.  Initially, the 
church accepted the private betrothal and wedding rites of the Romans and Germanic 
peoples and allowed them to continue, merely urging the church's followers to seek a 
priest's blessing for their marriage.33  Between the 11th and 12th centuries, the church had 
gained exclusive jurisdiction over issues related to marriage in Europe and England and 
had the power to determine the validity of marriages.  By the end of the 12th century, the 
church had developed a comprehensive canon law of marriage which became the secular 
theory of marriage.34  Between the 10th and 13th centuries, the church continued to make 
more fervent demands that its followers be married in a church ceremony and provided for 
censure of those who did not comply.  This was probably an attempt to both provide more 
of a religious tone to the institution and to provide for publicity of the marriage to avoid the 
problems attributable to clandestine marriages.35  However, even as the church increased 
its demands regarding marriage formalities, because marriage was viewed as a sacrament 
by the church and subject to natural law, the church was reticent to declare private 
marriages invalid or void.36 
In developing its concept of what constituted a valid marriage, the church's canon legal 
scholars advanced various theories that attempted to incorporate the concepts of marriage 
validity of the Romans and the Germanic peoples.  Gratian, an influential early canon legal 
scholar, advanced the theory that freely given individual consent followed by coitus was 
necessary for a valid marriage.37  Following Gratian in approximately 1152 A.D., Peter 
Lombard, a professor at the University of Paris and later bishop of Paris, advanced an 
alternate theory.  His theory distinguished between vows exchanged in the future tense and 
those exchanged in the present tense.  Consent of the parties in the form of a betrothal 
agreement that constituted words of the future was too tentative; it was only a promise to 
                                            
29 W. Goodsell, A History of Marriage and the Family, at 135-36 (1934). 
30 Geis at 21. 
31 1 G. Howard, A History of Matrimonial Institutions, at 292 (1904). 
32 Geis at 55. 
33 Howard at 293 and Goodsell at 173. 
34 Schroeder at 1173. 
35 Howard at 309-10. 
36 Id. at 334-39. 
37 Schroeder at 1175. 
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marry sometime in the future. Instead he suggested that present consent or words of the 
present be required as a condition of a valid marriage.38 
By the 13th century ecclesiastical legal scholars reached a compromise as to what 
constituted a valid marriage: 
[I]t was eventually agreed that neither familial consent, feudal consent, priestly 
blessing, nor any formal ceremony was required for a valid and enforceable 
marriage.  A marriage could be formed either by present individual consent, with 
or without coitus, or future individual consent (i.e., betrothal) followed by coitus.39 
From the 13th to the 16th centuries, even as the church increasingly required more 
formalization and publicizing of and intervention in marriages, the church continued to 
recognize private, informal marriages as valid, based on their sacramental, divinely 
ordained nature.40  However, any marriage contracted without the church's intervention, 
although binding, was "illegal" in the eyes of the church and subject to ecclesiastical 
penalties such as severe penance.41  The continued recognition of informal, private, or 
"clandestine" marriages, however, was problematic: 
  Clandestine marriages . . . became so frequent from the thirteenth to the 
sixteenth century as to constitute well-nigh a public scandal, since they not 
infrequently led to grave social wrongs.  A man thus married could and did easily 
throw off the responsibilities he had assumed at marriage, and in consequence 
his wife and children might become public charges.42 
  Men and women (or boys and girls) who contracted unions in words of the 
present tense were held to be as indissolubly bound together as if the marriage 
had occurred within the church before witnesses, had been duly recorded and 
had been consummated by physical union.  Of course a marriage thus loosely 
contracted, with witnesses few or none, could be easily disavowed.  
Dishonorable men had no difficulty in finding persons to declare in the proper 
ecclesiastical court that they had never really espoused the woman, but had only 
formed an illicit relationship with her . . . .  Endless difficulties arose with respect 
to abandoned wives and children, and the Bishops' courts of the fifteenth and the 
first half of the sixteenth century were kept busy adjudicating such matrimonial 
cases.43 
In 1545, in response to the continuing concern relating to clandestine marriages and in 
response to the Protestant assertions of ecclesiastical corruption and that marriage should 
be a temporal, civil matter, the church called a council at Trent, the 19th ecumenical council 
of the Roman Catholic Church.44  Concluding in 1563, the Council of Trent decreed that 
marriages previously contracted by verbal consent alone and without parental consent 
would be held valid, but in the future all marriages not celebrated in the presence of a priest 
                                            
38 Geis at 137-39. 
39 Schroeder at 1175. 
40 David E. Engdahl, The Secularization of English Marriage Law, 16 U. Kan. L. Rev. 505, 507 (1968). 
41 Goodsell at 223. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 261. 
44 Id. at 260 and "The Council of Trent", http://www.forerunner.com/chalcedon/X0020_15._Council_of_Trent.html. 
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and witnesses would be null and void.45  This, in essence, abolished informal, private 
marriage on the European continent. 
In England, after the Act of Supremacy in 1534 and England's break with the Roman 
Catholic Church, England no longer recognized the canon law of the Roman Catholic 
Church.46  Therefore, at the time of the Council of Trent, because the English Reformation 
had already taken place, the results of the Council of Trent did not apply to England.  The 
Church of England, and the ecclesiastics who had jurisdiction to determine the validity of 
marriage, while generally requiring formal marriages, continued to allow marriages per 
verba de praesenti. 
The canons of the Church of England, like those of the Catholic Church, created a 
distinction between a valid marriage which was legally binding on the parties and an 
"illegal" marriage which, because it was not solemnized through the intervention of the 
church, was subject to ecclesiastical penalties.  In addition, even though the Church of 
England recognized these marriages as valid, the lay or temporal courts under the civil law 
did not bestow full marital rights on the parties to such marriages, perhaps to impede the 
growth of clandestine marriages.  The lay courts required publicity of the marriage in order 
to endow the parties with certain marital rights.  "The widow could not receive her dower 
unless it had been publicly assigned at the nuptials before the church door . . . .  Marriages 
contracted elsewhere may be valid enough, but only at the church door can a bride be 
endowed."47  "Marriages per verba de praesenti were not complete for all purposes.  At 
best, such informal unions merely made the children legitimate.  The informal union 
bestowed no civil rights upon the parties, such as the right of a wife to claim dower or of the 
husband to claim curtesy."48 
For a short period of time, from 1653 until 1658, when Oliver Cromwell was Lord 
Protector of England, the English Puritans did pass a Civil Marriage Act prohibiting 
ecclesiastical marriages and requiring a civil celebration.  Additionally, under this Act, all 
matters and controversies relating to marriage were to be referred to the civil authorities.  
Even though the Puritans brought this idea to America, in England this Act was repealed in 
1660 and England thereafter again provided for ecclesiastical marriages until the 19th 
century.49  It was not until 1753 that Parliament enacted the Clandestine Marriage Bill, or 
Lord Hardwicke's Act, that required publication of banns (public notice of a marriage 
contract and impending celebration of the marriage) or the securing of a license, 
performance of the ceremony by a clergyman of the Anglican Church, and the presence of 
witnesses at the ceremony for a valid marriage.  All marriages not contracted within the 
requirements were null and void.50  However, "The English Marriage Act of 1753, by its 
                                            
45 Goodsell at 262. 
46 Hon. John B. Crawley, Is the Honeymoon Over for Common-law Marriage:  A Consideration of the Continued Viability of the Common-
law Marriage Doctrine, 29 Cumberland L Rev. 399, 401 n. 8 (1998-1999). 
47 Howard at 354-56. 
48 Graham Kirkpatrick, Common-Law Marriages:  Their Common Law Basis and Present Need, 6 St. Louis U. L.J. 30, 39 (1960).  This 
distinction would have an effect on recognition of informal marriages in the English colonies in the United States.  See Denison v. 
Denison, 35 Md. 361 (1872) and In re Roberts Estate, 133 P.2d 492, 494 (Wyo. 1943), at n.60, in which the courts argued that 
England never recognized common law marriages unless the marriage was publicly solemnized and that therefore, the common law in 
the United States that does not require public solemnization is derived from Roman law and canon law, not from English common law. 
49 Goodsell at 269. 
50 Id. at 334. 
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terms did not apply to the American colonies since it excluded marriages solemnized 
beyond the seas.51 
C. Adoption of Common Law Marriage in the United States. 
During the 16th through the 18th centuries, the extent of the adoption of common law 
marriage as part of the transfer of English common law to the American colonies varied.  
Because informal cohabitation existed in the American colonies, some of the colonies 
recognized common law marriage, while others required compliance with certain 
formalities.52  In general, the colonies adopted English common law "only so far as it could 
be made to fit and adjust itself to our local circumstances and peculiar institutions."53 
For example, in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, the dissenters from the Church of 
England objected to the regulation of marriage by canon law, and as early as 1639 adopted 
statutes and regulations governing marriage in that colony.  Once these laws were passed, 
requiring a formal ceremony, licensing or registration, and designating the officiant, 
common law marriage was no longer available.  Other colonies that followed this path 
included Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland,54 North Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia.55  In 
contrast to this, New York, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and New 
Jersey chose to accept informal marriages.56 
A number of explanations have been presented regarding the acceptance or rejection 
of common law marriage in the territories and states settled beyond the original colonies.  
One theory is that frontier conditions, sparse settlements, distance from a location for 
recording the marriage, and lack of access to legal officiants explain the acceptance of the 
informal common law marriage tradition by the states.   
  It is only natural that under such primitive conditions our early settlers would 
devise some means of making marriage possible and clothing the form with 
respectability.  The means selected was for parties contemplating a union openly 
to avow their intentions and begin living together as husband and wife. 57 
In Louisiana, where the common law was never adopted, common law marriage was 
never accepted.  Territories and states with Spanish, Mexican, Native American, or other 
influences reflected these influences in their acceptance or rejection of common law 
marriage in the particular state.58 
                                            
51 Kirkpatrick at 34. 
52 Kathryn S. Vaughn, The Recent Changes to the Texas Informal Marriage Statute:  Limitation or Abolition of Common-Law Marriage?, 
28 Houston L. Rev. 1131, 1134 (1991). 
53 Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361 (1872) (part 10 of opinion). 
54 See Denison (parts 10 and 11 of opinion), in which the Court of Appeals of Maryland noted that marriage contracts per verba de 
praesenti or per verba de futuro cum copula, until sanctioned by the ecclesiastical courts, did not confer the civil rights incident to a 
marriage.  Because Maryland had no tribunal, such as the ecclesiastical courts, to enforce the solemnization of these types of 
marriages, these marriages were incomplete and could not confer legitimacy on issue or the rights of property on the parties.  
Therefore, under Maryland law, a marriage for the purposes of the civil rights incident to marriage required some type of ceremony or 
celebration.  Even though the statute did not specifically nullify common law marriage, it was still interpreted as mandatory; otherwise, 
it would contravene the spirit and policy of the statute. 
55 Bowman at 720 n.43. 
56 Id. at 722. 
57 Kirkpatrick at 45-46. Kirkpatrick goes on to note that "This no doubt explains why some jurisdictions in the United States have included 
cohabitation or the open assumption of marital obligations and duties as elements of a common-law marriage." 
58 Bowman at 725-31.  See, e.g., Hallet v. Collins, 51 U.S. 174, 181-82 (1850), in which the United States Supreme Court in an appeal 
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Alabama held that a marriage made without the presence of a 
priest was valid in Alabama while it was still a Spanish colony because while Spain had accepted the pronouncements of the Council 
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Early case law presents explanations for acceptance or rejection of common law 
marriage in the United States and established the precedent for states' responses 
thereafter.  The majority of jurisdictions in the United States initially followed the holding of 
Fenton v. Reed and recognized common law marriages.59  A minority of jurisdictions 
followed Inhabitants of Milford v. Inhabitants of Worcester, and did not recognize common 
law marriage as valid.60  In the United States Supreme Court's first attempt to determine 
the validity of common law marriage, the Court was equally divided.61  In a later case, 
Meister v. Moore,62 the United States Supreme Court held that marriage was a common 
                                                                                                                                                  
of Trent for its European dominions, it had not done so for its American dominions.  Therefore, the law applicable to Alabama was the 
law that predated the Council of Trent for the colonies which required only consent to constitute a valid marriage. 
59 4 Johns 52 (N.Y. 1809).  In Fenton, the Supreme Court of New York reviewed a case in which a woman was seeking a pension from 
an organization of which her deceased alleged husband was a member.  The court held that the woman had a valid common law 
marriage with this man.  The court noted that even though no solemnization had taken place, proof of an actual marriage was not 
necessary.  A marriage could be proven by inferring a marriage from cohabitation of the parties, reputation, acknowledgment of the 
parties, reception of the family, and other circumstances.  A marriage made per verba de praesenti amounts to an actual marriage and 
is as valid as a marriage in facie ecclesiae. 
60 7 Mass. 48 (1810).  In Milford, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed an action for assumpsit, for the maintenance of 
a family of paupers.  The man had legal settlement in Worcester, and if the couple had a valid marriage, the woman and their children 
would have the same legal settlement as the man, and Worcester would be liable for their maintenance.  The issue was whether the 
couple had a valid marriage.  The couple had come together at a tavern, and a justice of the peace happened to be there.  The couple 
produced a certificate demonstrating that their intentions to marry had been published and asked the justice of the peace to marry 
them.  He refused, but they continued to exchange vows before the people gathered there.  The court examined the law to determine if 
this exchange resulted in a lawful marriage.  The court noted that since the time their ancestors left England, lawful marriage was 
required to be celebrated before a clergyman.  When their ancestors arrived "smarting under the arbitrary censures of the 
ecclesiastical courts," they did not want to provide the clergy with civil powers, and the early ordinance regulating marriage therefore 
provided that only a magistrate or other appointed person could solemnize marriages.  Additional regulations for marriage were 
subsequently enacted.  Id. at 52.  The court noted that when laws of a state have not prescribed such regulations for the celebration of 
a marriage, then the mere mutual agreement to marry by competent parties would be a good marriage.  However, when a government 
has established regulations for the celebration of marriage, then these must be followed to constitute a valid marriage. 
    See also Furth v. Furth, 133 S.W. 1037 (Ark. 1911), but see Huard v. McTeigh, 232 P. 658, 661-62 (Ore. 1925), in which the 
Supreme Court of Oregon noted that the decisions in the United States relating to common law marriage were in "hopeless conflict" 
and that even though the Oregon statute did not explicitly abrogate common law marriage, this was "carrying the rule of statutory 
construction too far" and the statutes of the state which regulated the manner of entering into a marriage superseded the common law 
rule; and In re Roberts' Estate, 133 P.2d 492 (Wyo. 1943), in which the Wyoming Supreme Court noted that this was a case of first 
impression regarding the validity of common law marriage in the state and that the law in the United States on the subject of common 
law marriage was in chaos.  The Court disagreed with the holding in Fenton, which held that no formal ceremony was necessary at 
common law to a valid marriage.  Instead, the Court noted that in England the parties to a marriage entered per verba de praesenti 
could be compelled to solemnize the marriage by ecclesiastical authorities, which enforceability equated to execution of a contract.  
Without this execution, the contract was only partly performed and was more like early Roman law which provided for informal 
marriages, concubinage, and easy divorce.  Notwithstanding the status of the common law in England, if the colonists did not have 
regulations in place relating to marriage to take the place of a religious ceremony, they would at least have adopted a ceremony with 
which they were familiar, which might have been according to the Church of England, of a particular group or denomination, or 
according to Cromwell's law, but in all cases there would have been a public ceremony.  Id. at 493-500.  The Court then reviewed 
Wyoming's own statute and determined that even though it did not expressly nullify common law marriage, neither the statute nor 
public policy would justify holding common law marriage valid.  Id. at 500-503. 
61 Lessee of Jewell v. Jewell, 42 U.S. 219 (1843).  In Jewell, an action for ejectment, brought on writ of error to the United States 
Supreme Court, one of the legal issues brought was who was the lawful wife of the deceased, who died intestate and was seised of 
the premises in question.  The instructions given to the jury were objected to as they provided that a contract of marriage made per 
verba de praesenti without cohabitation or per verba de futuro followed by consummation amounted to a valid marriage and was as 
equally binding as if made in facie ecclesiae.  The Supreme Court noted that the instructions involved the question as to what 
constituted marriage under the laws of Georgia and South Carolina.  The Supreme Court stated that:  "[t]he question has, of course, no 
concern with the nature and character of the union of man and wife in a religious point of view.  But regarding it (as a court of justice 
must do) merely as a civil contract, and deciding in what form it ought to have been celebrated in order to give the parties the legal 
rights of property which belong to the husband or the wife, and to render the issue legitimate, the Circuit Court held, and so instructed 
the jury, that if they believed that, before any sexual connexion between the parties, they, in the presence of her family and friends, 
agreed to marry, and did afterwards live together as man and wife, the tie was indissoluble even by mutual consent.  And that if the 
contract be made per verba de presenti, and remains without cohabitation; or if made per verba de futuro, and be followed by 
consummation, it amounts to a valid marriage, and which the parties (being competent as to age and consent) cannot dissolve; and 
that it is equally binding as if made in facie ecclesiae.  Upon the point thus decided, this court is equally divided; and no opinion can 
therefore be given."  Id. at 233-34. 
62 96 U.S. 76 (1877).  In Meister, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a contract per verba de praesenti constituted a 
common law marriage, and that in order to abrogate the existence of common law marriage, a statute would have to explicitly express 
this, and not be merely directory.  In this case, the parties were married in Michigan, but did not comply with the statute that required 
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right and that statutes regulating marriage would be interpreted as merely directory unless 
the statute explicitly provided words of nullity of common law marriage. 
D. The Decline of Common Law Marriage in the United States. 
As states began to abolish common law marriage beginning in approximately 1875, 
the reasoning related to:  (1) urbanization and industrialization which eliminated problems 
of access to civil authorities; (2) increased wealth in private hands, leading to concerns of 
protecting inheritances from fraudulent claims and transmission of wealth to legitimate 
heirs; (3) protecting the institution of marriage; (4) racism, eugenics, and class bias; and (5) 
administrative and judicial efficiency concerns.63 
E. Current Status of Common Law Marriage in the United States and the District of 
Columbia. 
The statutory and common law marriage chart in the appendix demonstrates the 
response of the states and the District of Columbia to the issue of the existence of common 
law marriage. 
1. States That Do Not Recognize Common Law Marriages Contracted by Their 
Citizens in Their Own State. 
In general, the states that have abolished common law marriage have followed  
Meister and explicitly abrogated common law marriage by statute (Arizona, California, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South 
Dakota, and Wisconsin).  It should be noted that all of the states that abrogated 
common law marriage by statute did so prospectively from a date certain.  In some 
cases, such as in the case of Pennsylvania, which applies to only common law 
marriages contracted after January 1, 2005, valid common law marriages could still be 
held to exist in those states.  
In the remainder of the states that do not recognize common law marriages, the 
courts have either disagreed with Meister and interpreted their statute as mandatory 
without the statute explicitly abrogating common law marriage, or have determined 
that common law marriage was never recognized in the state (Alaska, Arkansas, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee [although Tennessee does 
provide for estoppel to deny marriage], Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, 
and Wyoming). 
                                                                                                                                                  
solemnization by a minister or magistrate.  They lived and cohabited together as man and wife and had a child.  The Court noted that a 
contract per verba de praesenti constitutes marriage at common law and that a statute may take away a common law right, but that 
this must be plainly expressed.  Statutes which establish regulations for marriage may be construed as merely directory, unless they 
contain express words of nullity.  The Court stated that "the statutes are held merely directory; because marriage is a thing of common 
right, because it is the policy of the State to encourage it, and because, as has sometimes been said, any other construction would 
compel holding illegitimate the offspring of many parents conscious of no violation of law."  Id. at 81.  The Court concluded that the 
Michigan statute in question did not declare marriages void if they did not involve the presence of a minister or magistrate and did not 
deny validity to marriages that were good at common law.  The Court also noted that subsequent to this case being heard by the state 
court, the Michigan Supreme Court had ruled in another case relating to a marriage in a foreign country that a marriage celebrated in a 
manner which did not meet the statutory regulations but which did provide for the parties agreeing in the present tense to be husband 
and wife, followed by cohabitation, would, on proof of these facts, constitute a valid marriage.  See Hutchins v. Kimmell, 31 Mich. 126 
(1875).  The Supreme Court therefore accepted this as the law of Michigan, reversed the judgment, and ordered a new trial so that 
evidence of the common law marriage could be presented. 
63 Bowman at 731-50. 
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2. States That Recognize Common Law Marriages Contracted by Their 
Citizens in Their Own State. 
The states that currently recognize common law marriages are Alabama, 
Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire (only for inheritance purposes 
after death of one of the parties), Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, 
Utah, and the District of Columbia. 
F. Iowa and Common Law Marriage. 
1. The Recognition of Common Law Marriage in Iowa. 
Common law marriage in Iowa has been recognized for over a century.64  
However, no public policy exists in Iowa favoring common law marriage.65  As in other 
states, the Iowa Supreme Court has interpreted the statutes regulating marriage, in 
keeping with Meister, to be merely directory such that a marriage contracted in 
violation of the statutory provisions, such as common law marriage, does not invalidate 
a marriage, even if there are penalties for those who do not comply with the statutory 
requirements.66  The Iowa Supreme Court also noted in In re Stopps' Estate that: 
 We have too long recognized the common-law marriage status in Iowa to 
change it by judicial decision.  If we should accept applicants' invitation 
either to hold it never existed here, or to overrule our previous decisions 
recognizing and making it effective, we should thereby with one blow not 
only strike down many property rights heretofore thought determined and 
vested, but illegitimize many children whose status has previously been 
secure.  There is a sound reason for adhering generally to settled principles 
of law.  They should not be overturned lightly, nor unless they appear 
patently unsound and liable to cause mischief if uncorrected.  The people 
should be able to know what the law is, and to order their affairs 
accordingly.  We cannot abandon the rule of stare decisis except for far 
more impelling reasons than we find here.  If the law as it has been settled 
by the courts and understood, not only by the legal profession but by the 
public generally, is to be changed, it is a task for the legislature.67 
In In re Stopps' Estate the Iowa Supreme Court also noted with regard to the 
mere directory nature of marriage statutes that it agreed with the rule in 35 Am.Jur., 
Marriage, § 33, that "[t]his construction 'is generally based on the view that a common-
law marriage is good, although not in conformity to the statutory requirements, unless 
the statute contains express words of nullity.'"  Therefore, the legislative intent to 
abrogate common law marriage in Iowa would not be presumed, but must be clearly 
expressed by the legislature.68 
                                            
64 In re Estate of Fisher, 176 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Iowa 1970). 
65 In re Marriage of Reed, 226 N.W.2d 795, 796 (Iowa 1975). 
66 In re Stopps' Estate, 57 N.W.2d 221, 224 (Iowa 1953). 
67 Id. at 223. 
68 Id at 224. 
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2. Common Law Marriage — Elements, Burden of Proof, Standard of Proof, 
Evidence. 
a. Elements.  The three elements that must exist to create a common law 
marriage in Iowa are: 
i. Intent and agreement in praesenti to be married by both parties. 
ii. Continuous cohabitation. 
iii. Public declaration or "holding out" to the public that the parties are 
husband and wife.69 
b. Present Intent.  The element of present intent and agreement to be married 
reflects the nature of marriage as a civil contract that requires the consent of 
the parties.70  The Iowa Supreme Court has stated the following: 
[M]arriage under our law is a contract — a civil contract.  But it is sui 
generis, and is regarded in law as something more, particularly when 
consummated.  It is a contract in which the public — the state — has an 
interest, and when consummated creates a status which no other 
contract does.  The state has a peculiar interest in such contracts . . . .71 
This element of present intent, however, does not require an express 
agreement to be fulfilled: 
[I]t is essential to show an agreement between the parties in praesenti 
to become husband and wife in order to establish a common-law 
marriage, but this does not mean that such proof must establish an 
express agreement resulting in contract, or that such result may not be 
circumstances from which an agreement in praesenti may be 
inferred.72 
If a written or oral agreement to be husband and wife does exist, without also 
the existence of the present intent to assume that relationship, such agreement 
does not constitute common law marriage, especially when the agreement is 
entered into for other purposes.73  The Iowa Supreme Court has recognized that a 
contract per verba de futuro, which implies marriage of the parties at a later time, 
does not establish a common law marriage without other circumstances.  
However, in In re Estate of Fisher, the Iowa Supreme Court noted that even 
though the parties had been planning a ceremonial marriage in the future, their 
existing relationship prior to the death of one of the parties, based upon the total 
contentions of the respective parties once added and their weight determined, did 
demonstrate the present intent of the parties to be married, and did constitute a 
common law marriage.74 
Additionally, with regard to the intentions of the parties, the Iowa Court of 
Appeals has stated the following: 
                                            
69 Fisher at 805. 
70 Id. 
71 Lauer v. Banning, 131 N.W.783, 784 (1911). 
72 In re Estate of Allen, 100 N.W. 2d 10, 13 (Iowa 1959) citing Markley v. Hudson, 54 N.E.2d 304, 306. 
73 Pegg v. Pegg, 115 N.W. 1027, 1028-30 (Iowa 1908). 
74 Fisher at 806-07. 
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 A person may be entitled to marital rights if his or her intention is to 
be married, even though the other person's intention is not the same, 
provided they cohabit and provided the conduct of one person justifies 
the other to believe he or she intended to be married.75 
The Iowa Supreme Court has noted the following in determining whether a 
common law marriage exists: 
[T]he fundamental question is whether their minds have met in mutual 
consent to the status of marriage which will be sufficiently established if 
it appears that they have lived together, intending thereby to be 
husband and wife.  Neither such intention nor consent can be inferred 
from cohabitation alone, and reputation is of no significance, save as it 
has a bearing on the questions of intent.76 
"The conduct of the parties and their general community reputation is 
evidence that can be used to support a present intent and agreement."77 
c. Continuous Cohabitation.  Another element of a common law marriage that 
must be proven is continuous cohabitation.  However, there is no particular time 
that cohabitation must exist to establish common law marriage.78  Additionally, 
cohabitation alone does not of itself constitute marriage79 because "[c]ommon 
law marriages do exist.  Concubinage also exists."80 
 The term "cohabiting as husband and wife" is ambiguous.  It may 
mean cohabitation under the assumption of the relation of husband and 
wife, or it may as well mean, without regard to any such actual relation, 
in the manner of cohabitation as between husband and wife.81 
So, then, evidence of cohabitation is merely evidence of the intent of the 
parties. 
Proof of cohabitation, as well as evidence of conduct and general repute in 
the community where the parties reside, tends to strengthen the showing of 
present agreement to be husband and wife as well as bearing on the 
question of intent.82 
                                            
75 Conklin ex rel. v. MacMillan Oil Company, 557 N.W.2d 102, 105 (Iowa App. 1996) citing In re Marriage of Winegard, 257 N.W.2d 609, 
616 (Iowa 1977) citing McFarland v. McFarland, 2 N.W. 269, 273-74 (Iowa 1879). 
76 In re Estate of Boyington, 137 N.W. 949, 950 (Iowa 1912). 
77 In re Marriage of Gebhart, 426 N.W.2d 651 (Iowa App. 1988) citing Gammelgaard v. Gammelgaard, 77 N.W.2d 479, 480 (Iowa 1956). 
78 Love v. Love, 171 N.W. 257 (Iowa 1919), overruled in part on other grounds by In re Estate of Dallman, 228 N.W.2d 187, 190 (Iowa 
1975). 
79 McFarland at 273. 
80 Hoese v. Hoese, 217 N.W. 860 (Iowa 1928). 
81 Boyington at 951.  Note:  In the context of spousal support and determination of a substantial change in circumstances, "[c]ohabitation 
is evidenced by: (1) an unrelated person of the opposite sex living or residing in the dwelling house . . . , (2) living together in the 
manner of husband and wife, and (3) unrestricted access to the home."  See In re Marriage of Ales, 592 N.W.2d 698, 702 n.1 (Iowa 
App. 1999). 
82 Gebhart at 652 citing Gammelgaard at 480. 
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d. Public Declaration.  The Iowa Supreme Court has held that the public 
declaration or holding out is the "acid test" in demonstrating a common law 
marriage.  As the court stated in In re Estate of Dallman, "In other words, there 
can be no secret common-law marriage." 83   
If there are inconsistencies in evidence as to the holding out of the parties to 
the public as husband and wife, i.e., evidence of the parties representing 
themselves as single people or not married, the court considers the evidence that 
weighs against the finding of a common law marriage to determine if the 
remainder of the evidence overcomes the evidence to the contrary.84  The 
"holding out," however, must be general and substantial.  "[O]ne element 
essential to the proof of such relationship is a general and substantial 'holding out' 
or open declaration thereof to the public by both parties thereto." (citations 
omitted)85 
e. Burden of Proof and Standard of Proof.  The burden of proof in a case to 
establish that a common law marriage exists is on the party asserting the claim.  
"The burden of proof lies on the party asserting the common law marriage."86  
"The party carrying the burden of proof must prove all the elements of such a 
common-law marriage by a preponderance of the evidence."87 
[A]ll of the essential elements of such a relationship must be shown by clear, 
consistent and convincing evidence, especially must all of the essential 
elements of such a relationship be shown when one of the parties is dead; 
and such marriage must be proved by a preponderance.88 
f. Evidence.  A common law marriage may be demonstrated by circumstantial 
evidence.89  Continuous cohabitation of the parties and a public declaration or 
holding out to the public that the parties are husband and wife is circumstantial 
evidence that creates a fair presumption that a common law marriage exists.90  
The total of various contentions by all parties must be added and weighed.91 
Examples of common law marriage cases in Iowa and the evidence 
presented in proving their existence include:  
• A woman who lived with a man for several years and who was the 
mother of his child was recognized in their society as his wife by 
entertaining together and following in funeral processions together in 
the family carriage, and by purchasing her wardrobe on his account.92 
• Having an article published in the local paper recognizing a farewell 
party honoring them as "Mr. and Mrs.," purchasing a combination 
husband and wife fishing license in Minnesota, Christmas cards and 
                                            
83 Dallman at 190. 
84 See Gebhart at 652-54; Fisher at 806; and Estate of Stodola, 519 N.W.2d 97, 98-100. 
85 Dallman at 190. 
86 Gebhart at 652 citing Winegard at 510. 
87 Gebhart at 652 citing In re Marriage of Grother, 242 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1976). 
88 Fisher at 805 citing 55 C.J.S. Marriage s 45b, pp.911, 912. 
89 Id. at 806; Allen at 12. 
90 Winegard at 617. 
91 In re Estate of Long, 102 N.W.2d 76, 81 (Iowa 1960). 
92 McFarland at 274. 
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invitations addressed to the couple as "Mr. and Mrs.," and charging 
household expenses to him.93 
• On an application for her life insurance policy, she named him as 
husband, they had a joint checking account, he placed a wedding ring 
on her finger in the presence of witnesses, and in an application for 
employment he indicated her as his wife.94 
• Her intent and belief that they were married, the public regarding them 
as married, continuous cohabitation, his failure to deny their marriage 
and acquiescence in allowing her to use his name and represent to the 
community that they were married, her receipt of a wedding band from 
him, hotel and travel reservations as "Mr. and Mrs.," receipt of wedding 
gifts without his objection, payment of retail accounts incurred by her 
with the appellation "Mrs.," his designation of her as beneficiary under 
his insurance policy as his wife, and checks endorsed to her using his 
last name as her own.95 
• Her intent and belief about their relationship, the community regarding 
them as husband and wife, continuous cohabitation for 16 years, his 
acquiescence in her use of his name and in representations to the 
community that they were husband and wife, her receipt of a diamond 
engagement ring and wedding ring from him, his payment of her 
charge accounts that were in the name of "Mrs.," payment of family 
and business debts from a single checking account, joint vacations 
with airline tickets using his last name for both, his introduction of her 
to friends and others as his wife, a joint AAA membership, operation of 
a business together, a newspaper publication for an auction sale listing 
them as owners with his last name, his will providing for her in a similar 
manner as providing for a spouse, and reference to her by his mother 
and sister as an "in-law."96 
• The parties submitted a statement as part of their tax audit stating that 
they had cohabited together as husband and wife, signed a health 
insurance contract document attesting to the fact that they had agreed 
to live as husband and wife which the court found most persuasive 
because it was signed before a notary, the man designated the woman 
as his beneficiary on his retirement plan as his common law wife, and 
they represented themselves as husband and wife at social events and 
while traveling.97 
• The parties cohabited for 14 years, filed tax returns with the filing 
status of married, filing jointly, and claimed her son as a dependent 
child, and he applied for and received social security benefits in a 
                                            
93 Gammelgaard at 482.  
94 Fisher at 805-06.  
95 Winegard at 612. 
96 Gebhart at 653. 
97 Stodola at 98-100. 
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greater amount because he led the benefits worker to believe that the 
parties were married.98  
The Iowa courts may not recognize a common law marriage when evidence 
is inconsistent and a finding that a common law marriage exists is merely for 
personal convenience or benefit. 
• The court did not find a common law marriage to exist in order for a 
man to assert spousal privilege in a criminal action when the parties 
filed separate, single-status tax returns, maintained separate bank 
accounts, owned little jointly held property, and could produce no 
witnesses other than themselves to attest that they held themselves 
out as husband and wife.99 
• In a loss of consortium action, the court noted that loss of consortium 
actions had been recognized for spouses, parents, and children, but 
not for unmarried cohabiting persons.  Iowa recognizes common law 
marriages, but not if the parties do not intend that result.  
The policy of this state is that the de jure family is the basic unit 
of social order.  This policy is reflected in statutes governing the 
right to marry (citation omitted).  It is reflected in the rule 
recognizing common law marriages.  It is demonstrated by 
statutes defining the rights and responsibilities of husbands and 
wives toward each other and toward their children (citation 
omitted).  The policy favoring marriage is not rooted only in 
community mores.  It is also rooted in the necessity of providing 
an institutional basis for defining the fundamental relational 
rights and responsibilities of persons in organized society. This 
policy would be subverted if persons could gain marital legal 
rights without accepting correlative marital legal 
responsibilities.100 
• An ex-wife sought review of a decision denying her spousal death 
benefits under the workers' compensation law.  After a divorce, the 
couple resumed cohabiting.  There was conflicting evidence of their 
status as husband and wife.  There was not a presumption in favor of 
establishing a common law marriage and there was no holding out or 
intent on her part to be married.101 
• The couple was married by a minister, but did not obtain a license, and 
after the ceremony they told others that they were not legally married 
because the woman would lose her John Deere surviving spouse's 
pension benefits.102 
                                            
98 In re Marriage of Wade, No. 98-1696 (Iowa App. June 14, 2000). 
99 State v. Ware, 338 N.W.2d 707, 711 (Iowa 1983). 
100 Laws v. Griep, 332 N.W. 2d 339, 340-41 (Iowa 1983). 
101 Conklin at 104. 
102 In re Estate of Atwood, 577 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa App. 1998). 
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• The parties were married ceremonially in 1988, had one child, divorced 
in 1990, and began cohabiting in 1991, which cohabitation lasted for 
10 years. The woman claimed that the initial divorce was obtained so 
that she could receive various forms of public assistance, including 
financial aid to attend college.  They maintained separate bank 
accounts, filed separate tax returns, the deed for a new home in 1999 
designated him as a single person and the mortgage designated him 
as unmarried, titles to vehicles were in his name only, he claimed to be 
her husband during her hospitalization stay, she maintained individual 
credit cards, they often represented themselves as married to the 
community, and their daughter assumed they were married and was 
surprised to learn that they had been divorced.  The fluctuating status 
of the couple was based on personal convenience or benefit. The 
inconsistency of the relationship undermines evidence of a present 
intent and agreement to be married.103 
G. Ending a Common Law Marriage.  
A common law marriage cannot be ended by mere agreement of the parties, but may 
only be ended as any other marriage, by death or dissolution.  While marriage is a civil 
contract, it is also a social institution and "[a]lthough the union is a voluntary one the tie 
may not be broken by agreement if the yoke becomes more irksome in reality than it 
appeared in prospect."104  The Iowa Supreme Court has stated that: 
  Once married by common law, one is married and subsequent 
representations of a single status do not invalidate the marriage by common law 
anymore than such representations would invalidate a marriage by ceremony.  A 
dissolution decree is necessary to dissolve either marriage.105 
H. Recent Developments and Anomalies in Common Law Marriage. 
1. Pennsylvania and Common Law Marriage. 
The status of common law marriage in Pennsylvania is of note because prior to 
January 1, 2005, Pennsylvania recognized common law marriages entered into in the 
state.  In Hantz v. Sealy,106 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established that a 
common law marriage could be entered into if entered into with the parties' full consent 
per verba de praesenti.  The words uttered could be in any form, as long as they were 
words in the present time.  In 1833, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in 
Rodebaugh v. Sanks that common law marriage was a necessary alternative to 
marriage statute requirements because without such alternative, children would be 
considered born out of wedlock.  Additionally, the Court held that the statute was 
merely directory and not the exclusive means to enter into a marriage.107 
In later years, the confusing nature of common law marriage in Pennsylvania was 
noted by the courts and was described by the Pennsylvania Superior Court as "a 
                                            
103 In re Marriage of Martin, 681 N.W.2d 612, 615-16, 618 (Iowa 2004). 
104 Hopping v. Hopping, 10 N.W.2d 87, 90 (Iowa 1943). 
105 Stodola at 100. 
106 6 Binn. 405 (Pa. 1814). 
107 2 Watts 9 (Pa. 1833) (part 2 of opinion). 
 
 Marriage Law 
 
19 
fruitful source of perjury and fraud, and, in consequence, they are to be tolerated, not 
encouraged . . . ."108  Later still, in another case, the Superior Court called common 
law marriage an anachronism because the reasons that had existed for common law 
marriage in frontier days no longer existed.109  In that case and in a later case, 
however, the court noted that any abrogation of the doctrine must be left to the 
legislature.110 
In Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer,111 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania once 
again stated its disfavor regarding common law marriages, and in a concurring 
opinion, two justices supported the abrogation of common law marriage in 
Pennsylvania, citing other states' decisions finding that common law marriage is 
misunderstood, antiquated, and promotes a lack of commitment, and because the 
frontier conditions no longer existed.  Following this decision, both chambers of the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly introduced legislation in 1999, 2001, and 2002 to 
abrogate common law marriage in Pennsylvania.112  The legislation was not enacted in 
any of these instances, and Pennsylvania law continued to state that, regarding the 
statutory requirement of obtaining a marriage license, "[t]his part shall not be 
construed to change the existing law with regard to common law marriage."113 
In PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Stamos), the Commonwealth 
Court (an appeals court that hears cases including appeals from decisions by state 
agencies) held that it would no longer recognize common law marriage claims, on a 
prospective basis, brought before the court.  The court determined that "anticipatory 
overruling" was appropriate because there was no question as to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court's intention.  In reaching the conclusion that common law marriage 
should be abrogated, the Commonwealth Court reasoned that single women are no 
longer viewed as a burden on the state and are now eligible to receive child support 
regardless of marital status, eligibility for inheritance rights of children no longer is 
based on the marital status of their parents, access to ceremonial marriages is easily 
available, the cost is minimal, and the process is quick and simple, and compliance 
with statutory requirements provides a screening of individuals to identify impediments 
and reduces the need for litigation to determine marital status.  The advantages 
suggested in abrogating common law marriage included providing a bright line 
standard in disputes for the courts when parties adhere to statutory requirements, 
protecting parties in vulnerable situations who were misguided in their reliance on the 
doctrine, and assisting third parties in knowing the marital status of people.114 
Following this ruling, there was confusion as to what the law regarding common 
law marriage was in Pennsylvania.  The Pennsylvania Superior Court (another court of 
appeals that hears criminal and certain civil appeals, and children and family-related 
appeals from the courts of common pleas) in Bell v. Ferraro115 applied the common 
                                            
108 Baker v. Mitchell, 17 A.2d 738, 741 (Pa. Super. 1941). 
109 Buradus v. General Cement Products Co., 48 A.2d 883, 885 (Pa. Super. 1946), aff'd, 52 A.2d 205 (1947). 
110 In re Miller, 448 A.2d 25, 32 (Pa. Super. 1982). 
111 714 A.2d 1016, 1019-1020, 1022-23 (Pa. 1998). 
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114 831 A.2d 1269, 1279-86 (Pa. Commw. 2003). 
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law marriage law and pointed out in a footnote that it was not bound by the 
Commonwealth Court's decision and that it deferred abolition of common law marriage 
to the legislature.  However, in another case, the Superior Court in Stackhouse v. 
Stackhouse ruled that although the matters before the Superior Court were not 
controlled by the decision of the Commonwealth Court, the common pleas trial courts 
in the state were not in error, per se, in applying the decision.  In that case, the court 
concluded that it would take no position on the continued viability of common law 
marriage in the state.116 
During the 2004 Legislative Session, the Pennsylvania General Assembly 
enacted legislation to bar the creation of any new common law marriage after January 
1, 2005.  Act 144, House Bill 2719 of 2004, amended 23 Pa. Cons. Stat., section 1103, 
by striking the language that provided that licensing requirements were not to be 
construed to change the existing law regarding common law marriage and instead to 
provide that no common law marriage contracted after January 1, 2005, would be 
valid, but did not render an otherwise valid common law marriage contracted before 
that date invalid. 
2. Utah and Common Law Marriage. 
In 1987, the Utah legislature, in an action that defied the trend of other states, 
enacted legislation, effective April 27, 1987, to recognize common law marriages 
contracted in that state.117  Prior to the enactment, Utah statute had, since 1888, 
prohibited and declared void any marriage that was not solemnized.118 
The history of the legislation providing for common law marriage reveals that it 
was enacted as a fiscal measure to reduce welfare abuse.  In speaking to the Utah 
Senate, Mr. Norman Angus, Director of the state Department of Social Services, noted 
that in terms of public assistance, the department could not consider as available the 
income or resources of an individual who resides in a household but has no legal 
responsibility for the care and maintenance of the woman or children in the household.  
Therefore, even if that individual is providing support to the household, the woman 
could still qualify for public assistance.119  Under the Aid to Families With Dependent 
Children Program, Utah denied stepparents who were legally obligated to support their 
children from being eligible for public assistance.  Just as with stepparents, if a court 
order existed establishing cohabiting persons as being married under the common law 
marriage process, the family would be disqualified for public assistance.120  The law, 
however, is not limited in application to those seeking public assistance.121 
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Since the passage of the statute in 1987, reportedly none of the common law 
marriage claims in the Utah courts have developed in the context of its stated purpose:  
to address welfare fraud.  Additionally, under the statute there have been problems 
with proof, issues of interpretation, and a constitutional challenge.122  In Kelley v. 
Kelley, a husband and wife who had been ceremonially married decided to transfer the 
company stock to the wife and then obtain a divorce in order to guard against the 
financial risk of the husband selling his company.  However, they also decided to make 
no changes in their predivorce relationship and to continue to cohabit.  They did not 
tell anyone, including their children, that they had divorced.  A few years later, after the 
husband's affair with another woman, Mrs. Kelley sued for a modified divorce decree 
based on the couple having a common law marriage.  The court held that a common 
law marriage had existed.123  In a dissent, Judge Jackson provided a historical 
analysis of common law marriage and its existence in Utah.  He noted that from the 
end of the 19th century common law marriage fell into disfavor, citing the reason that 
the impediments to ceremonial marriage brought about by life on the frontier no longer 
existed.  He noted that Utah was in the "vanguard" of a cycle of restoring common law 
marriage in the United States, but stated, "However, it seems more likely that Utah's 
statute is an anachronistic rear guard."124  Judge Jackson continued by noting that the 
breadth of application of the common law statute, which had been enacted for the 
narrow purpose of addressing welfare fraud, had a much broader application.  He 
noted that a review of the cases revealed that other substantive areas of law had been 
implicated, including ownership and transfer of real and personal property, divorce and 
the attendant issues of child custody, child support, and property distribution, criminal 
law, and the motion in a criminal case by a county prosecutor to establish a common 
law marriage between a man and one of his wives in order to prosecute the man for 
bigamy.  Judge Jackson noted other concerns with the statute and urged the 
legislature to institute a different administrative remedy for welfare fraud and not 
"recycle" the experiment of common law marriage.125 
3. Oklahoma and Common Law Marriage. 
Various sources have concluded that common law marriage was abrogated by 
statute in Oklahoma in 1994 or 1998.126  However, a group of Oklahoma legislators 
met in 2001 to receive testimony regarding whether or not to continue to recognize 
common law marriage and since that time have proposed legislation to prohibit 
common law marriage.  The meeting of legislators in 2001 provided testimony 
specifying that the problems with common law marriage in Oklahoma were the legal 
problems such as spousal claims, probate cases, guardianship, social security cases, 
and insurance claims.  The second issue was of a moral nature:  the message being 
                                                                                                                                                  
general reputation as husband and wife.  The order to establish the conditions would have to occur no later than one year after the 
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122 Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family:  A Critique of the American Law Institute's "Domestic Partners" Proposal, 2001 BYU L. Rev. 
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124 Id. at 183. 
125 Id. at 185-86. 
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November 1, 1998, www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/commonlaw.htm.  In her article, Cynthia Bowman reports that common law marriage in 
Oklahoma was abolished by statute in 1994.  Bowman at 715, n.24. 
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sent to young people by legitimizing "shacking up."  Some asserted that common law 
marriage is no longer relevant in a society in which marriage is convenient and where 
lack of finality and uncertainty cause problems.  Others noted that common law 
marriage has prevented some injustices and that the issue is the level of government 
enforcement in people's lives. 
The author of HB1455, 2005 General Assembly, Rep. Lee Denney, provided that 
the intent of the bill was to strengthen marriage by returning it to its Christian 
foundation and that common law marriage did not have a Christian foundation 
because the parties were not making a commitment before God.127 
In addition to the activity of the Oklahoma General Assembly, the Oklahoma 
courts continue to recognize common law marriage in the state.128 
I. The Future of Common Law Marriage. 
Arguments against common law marriage include:  (1) difficulties brought about due to 
lack of public marriage records to verify property rights of common law spouses; (2) 
avoidance of the state's marriage statutes which are in opposition to the public policy 
behind these regulations, including medical examinations; (3) prevention of the spread of 
disease; (4) avoidance of fee payment to finance recordkeeping; (5) avoidance of waiting 
periods established to prevent impulsive unions; (6) difficulty in proving common law 
marriages; (7) the belief that sanctioning common law marriage debases formal marriages 
and encourages immorality and encourages perjury and fraud by unwed cohabitants 
hoping to gain the financial benefits of marriage; (8) imposing unintended legal 
relationships and obligations on parties; and (9) the idea that common law marriages are 
clandestine and promiscuous and that common law marriage should be used to punish 
those involved in illicit relationships.129 
In contrast, the arguments for retaining common law marriage include:  (1) providing 
legal status to parties, thereby reducing vice (because common law marriage focuses on 
the relationship of the parties rather than on the fact of a ceremony, establishing a common 
law marriage thereby elevates the status of the relationship); (2) common law marriage 
does not promote meretricious relationships because if a relationship is simply 
meretricious, a common law marriage will not be established because the relationship must 
be public and is difficult to prove; (3) although common law marriage may circumvent the 
public policy of maintaining records and requiring examinations, common law marriage 
supports the public policies of preventing illegitimacy, reducing promiscuity, and 
encouraging marriage; (4) protecting the good faith expectations of the parties; (5) 
protecting the poor, women, children, and members of minority groups who would be most 
adversely affected by the abrogation of common law marriage; and (6) that if common law 
marriages did not exist, states would merely utilize other doctrines to address the needs of 
cohabiting couples, such as the doctrines of implied contract, putative marriage, marriage 
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by estoppel, prescription and ratification, and the use of statutes that legitimize children 
when parents are not married. 130 
In the final analysis, the public policy of the state on common law marriage has 
generally been left to the legislature to determine.  In Iowa, as noted previously, the 
legislative intent to abrogate common law marriage in Iowa would not be presumed, but 
must be clearly expressed by the legislature.131  To date, Iowa has followed the guidance 
proposed in the following excerpt: 
'The institution of marriage, commencing with the race, and attending man in all 
periods, in all countries of his existence, has ever been considered the particular 
glory of the social system.  It has shown forth in dark countries, and in dark 
periods of the world, a bright luminary on his horizon.  And but for this institution, 
all that is valuable, all that is virtuous, all that is desirable in human existence, 
would long since have faded away in the general retrograde of the race, and in 
the perilous darkness in which its joys and its hopes would have been wrecked 
together.'  Marriage, then, says Mr. Bishop, is to be cherished by the 
government, as the first and choicest object of its regard.  'Therefore every court, 
in considering questions not clearly settled or defined in the law, should lean 
towards this institution of marriage; holding, consequently, all persons to be 
married who, living in the way of husband and wife, may accordingly be 
presumed to have intended entering into the relation, unless the rule of law which 
is set up to prevent this conclusion is distinct and absolute, or some impediment 
of nature intervenes.'132 
IV. Statutory Marriage. 
A. History of Statutory Marriage in Iowa.  
1840.  The Revised Statutes of the Territory of Iowa, compiled in 1843, chapter 100, 
effective March 1, 1840, provided for the regulation of marriages. 
Gender, Age, and Race.  Section 1 provided for the marriage of males 18 years of 
age and females 14 years of age, not nearer than first cousins, and not having a living 
husband or wife.  If the male was less than 21 years of age, and if the female was less than 
18 years of age, the consent of their fathers, or if their fathers were dead or incapacitated, 
the consent of their mothers or guardians, was necessary. 
Section 13 provided that all marriages of white persons with Negroes or mulattoes 
were illegal and void. 
License, Verification, and Fee.  Section 6 required the parties to the marriage to 
obtain a license from the clerk of the district court in the county where the female resided, 
with the exception of Friends or Quakers, who were exempt from the license requirement. 
Section 7 directed the clerk of the district court to inquire of the parties, upon oath or 
affirmation, as to the legality of the marriage, and, if the clerk was satisfied that there was 
no legal impediment to the marriage, to issue the license.  If a party was underage, the 
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consent of the parents or guardian was to be provided personally before the clerk, or 
certified by the parent or guardian, attested to by two witnesses.  One witness was then 
required to appear before the clerk to affirm the certification of the parent or guardian.  The 
statute provided that the clerk could collect $1.25 for administering the oaths or affirmation, 
granting the license, recording the certificate of marriage, and filing the necessary papers.  
If the clerk did not comply with the provisions and issued or signed a marriage license in 
another manner, the clerk was subject to payment to the aggrieved party of a sum not to 
exceed $500. 
Solemnization.  Sections 2 through 5 provided that ordained ministers licensed by the 
clerk of the district court of any county, justices of the peace, and certain other religious 
societies were authorized to solemnize marriages. 
Section 11 provided that if a person solemnized a marriage not in keeping with the 
statute or if the person was not legally authorized to solemnize a marriage, the person, 
upon conviction, was subject to payment to the county of a sum not to exceed $500 or a 
sum equaling $500, respectively. 
Section 12 provided that any fine or forfeiture arising under the chapter was 
recoverable by action or debt or by indictment. 
Certificate of Marriage and Recording.  Section 8 provided that a certificate of 
marriage was to contain the Christian names and surnames, ages, and places of residence 
of the parties.  The time and place of the marriage was to be transmitted to the clerk of the 
district court of the county where the marriage was solemnized within three months of the 
marriage to be recorded by the clerk. 
Section 9 provided that the person responsible for transmitting the certificate was 
subject to payment of a fine of $50 to the county for failure to do so, and the clerk was 
subject to a like fine for failing to record the certificate. 
Section 10 provided that the record of the marriage by the clerk or a copy of the record 
was presumptive evidence of the marriage. 
Validity.  Section 14 provided that all laws in effect that were not embraced by the 
statutes of the state on the subject of marriage were repealed. 
1842 — Solemnization.  Chapter 101, effective February 17, 1842, as codified in the 
Revised Statutes of the Territory of Iowa of 1843, provided that marriages that were 
solemnized by an ordained or licensed minister in the territory prior to that date were held 
to be as valid under the law as those solemnized by a minister licensed as required by 
chapter 100 of the Revised Statutes. 
1844 — Solemnization.  Chapter 5 of the Laws of Iowa, passed at the Extra Session 
of the Legislative Assembly commencing June 17, 1844, and effective June 19, 1844, 
provided that in addition to ordained ministers, any minister of the gospel who provided 
credentials as being a regular licensed minister or preacher of any religious society was 
authorized to solemnize marriages in the same manner as if he were ordained. 
1851.  The Code of Iowa, approved February 5, 1851, provided for regulation of 
marriage. 
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Civil Contract.  Code section 1463 provided that marriage was a civil contract 
requiring the consent of the parties capable of entering into other contracts, unless an 
exception was otherwise provided. 
Gender and Age.  Code section 1464 provided that a marriage was valid between a 
male of 16 years of age and a female of 14 years of age.  If a party had not reached the 
age required, the marriage was a nullity at the option of the underage party at any time until 
the party was six months older than the required age. 
License, Verification, and Fee.  Under Code section 1465, prior to marriage the 
parties were required to obtain a license from the judge of the county court of the county in 
which the marriage would be solemnized. 
Code section 1466 provided that a license was not to be granted if the parties were 
under the necessary age, if the parties did not have the consent of a parent or guardian if 
either was a minor, or if either party was not otherwise capable of entering into a civil 
contract. 
Under Code sections 1467 and 1468, the judge was required to take testimony of 
competent and disinterested witnesses as to the age and condition of the parties to the 
marriage, unless the judge was acquainted with the age and condition of the parties, and 
was to enter the application for the license on the records of the county court stating 
acquaintance with the parties or the proof of the facts made by the witnesses and providing 
their names. 
Code section 1469 required consent of the parent or guardian of a minor party to be 
filed in the county office. 
Under Code section 1470, a judge who granted a license contrary to the law was guilty 
of a misdemeanor.  If a marriage was solemnized without a license, the parties and anyone 
aiding the marriage were guilty of a misdemeanor. 
Code section 1471 required that a fee of $1 be paid to the county treasurer for the 
license. 
Solemnization.  Under Code section 1472, solemnization of a marriage could be 
performed by a justice of the peace, a judge of the county court, or the mayor of the city 
where the marriage took place; by a judge of the Supreme Court or district court of the 
state; or by an officiating minister of the gospel, ordained or licensed according to his 
denomination. 
Under Code section 1474, if a marriage was solemnized with the consent of the 
parties but in a manner other than the manner prescribed by the statute, the marriage was 
valid, but the parties and any person aiding them were subject to a penalty of $50 to be 
paid to the school fund. 
Code section 1477 provided an exception to the solemnization requirements for 
members of certain denominations that had a peculiar mode of performing that ceremony.  
Under Code section 1478, in such a case, if the services of a clergyman or magistrate were 
not used, the husband was responsible for return of the certificate of marriage and was 
subject to the $50 penalty if the return was not made. 
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Certificate of Marriage and Recording.  Following the solemnization, Code section 
1473 required that the officiating minister or magistrate provide each of the parties with a 
certificate of the marriage. 
Code section 1475 provided that a person solemnizing a marriage was also subject to 
the $50 penalty if the person did not return the certificate to the county court within 90 days 
after the ceremony. 
Code section 1476 required the clerk of the county court to keep a register of the 
names of the parties, the date of the marriage, and the name of the person solemnizing the 
marriage.  This record was evidence of the marriage. 
Legitimization.  Under Code section 1479, illegitimate children were made legitimate 
by the subsequent marriage of their parents. 
2005.  In In re Stopps' Estate in 1953, the Iowa Supreme Court noted that "our law as 
to license requirements and ceremonial marriages has not greatly changed since the Code 
of 1851."133  Chapter 595 of the Code of Iowa (2005) specifies the statutory requirements 
for entering into a marriage in the state. 
Definitions.  Code section 595.1 provides definitions related to the county system for 
data storage and retrieval. 
Civil Contract.  Code section 595.1A provides that marriage is a civil contract, and the 
parties must provide consent and must be capable of entering into contracts, unless an 
exception is otherwise provided. 
Gender and Age.  Code section 595.2 provides that the parties to a marriage in Iowa 
must be a male and a female in order for the marriage to be valid.  The parties must be at 
least 18 years of age, unless they meet the alternative requirements of the statute.  If the 
parties falsely represent their age as 18 years of age or older, the marriage is valid unless 
the person who falsely represented their age makes their true age known in an annulment 
proceeding initiated prior to reaching their 18th birthday.  A child born to a marriage voided 
in accordance with these provisions is legitimate.  The alternative requirements with 
reference to age provide that if the parties are 16 or 17 years of age, they must obtain the 
written consent of the parents, a parent, or a guardian of the underage party and the written 
consent must be approved by a judge of the district court.  If both parents of the underage 
party are dead, incompetent, or cannot be located, and the underage party does not have a 
guardian, the judge must approve the proposed marriage.  A judge's approval must be 
based upon a finding that the underage party or parties are capable of assuming the 
responsibilities of marriage and the marriage will serve their best interest.  Pregnancy alone 
cannot be used to establish "best interest."  If a parent or guardian withholds consent, the 
judge, upon application of the party, is to determine if consent was unreasonably withheld 
and then proceed based on the judge's determination. 
License, Verification, and Fee.  Under Code section 595.3, prior to solemnizing a 
marriage, the parties must obtain a marriage license from the county registrar. (Under Code 
section 331.611, the recorder is deemed to be the county registrar.)  Code section 595.3 
provides the circumstances under which a license is not to be granted, such as the parties 
being underage or closely related or lacking capacity to contract. 
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Under Code section 595.3A, the application form for a license to marry is to include 
information relating to abuse prevention. 
Under Code section 595.4, in order to receive a marriage license, the parties must 
sign and file a verified application for the license with the county registrar in the county in 
which the license is to be issued.  The application must include the social security numbers 
of the parties and at least one affidavit of a competent and disinterested person as to the 
age and qualifications of the parties.  The fee for filing an application for a marriage license 
is $35, which includes payment for one certified copy of the original certificate of marriage. 
(Under Code section 331.605, the county registrar is authorized to retain $4 of each such 
fee for provision of the certified copy of the marriage certificate.  The remainder of the fee is 
forwarded to the State Registrar of Vital Statistics on a monthly basis along with the original 
certificates of marriage.)  After receiving the application, the county registrar may issue the 
marriage license, which becomes valid upon the expiration of three days after the date of 
issuance of the license.  A license to marry may be validated prior to the expiration of the 
three-day waiting period due to emergency or extraordinary circumstances upon the order 
of a judge of the district court following application by the parties filed with the county 
registrar.  A fee of $5 is to be paid to the county registrar upon application for such an 
order, in addition to the fee for the marriage license.  (Under Code section 331.605, waiver 
of the fee for early validation of the marriage may be authorized by the district court if the 
applicant demonstrates the inability to pay.)  Code section 595.5 provides a process for the 
parties to indicate a name change in the application for a marriage license.  The name used 
on the marriage license becomes the legal names of the parties to the marriage.  Under 
Code section 595.7, the county registrar is also to provide the parties with a blank return 
when the license is issued. 
Solemnization.  Code section 595.9 provides that if the marriage of parties is 
solemnized without the procuring of a license, the parties and all those aiding them are 
guilty of a simple misdemeanor.  Under Code section 595.11, if a marriage is solemnized 
with the consent of the parties, but not in accordance with statutory requirements, the 
marriage is valid, but the parties and the persons aiding and abetting them are to pay $50 
each to the Treasurer of State for deposit in the General Fund of the State.  The payment 
of the fee does not apply to the person conducting the marriage ceremony if the person 
makes the return of the certificate of marriage to the county registrar within 15 days of the 
marriage.   
Under Code section 595.10, after obtaining the marriage license, the marriage of the 
parties may be solemnized by a judge of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or district 
court, including a district associate judge, an associate juvenile judge, a judicial magistrate, 
or a senior judge, or by a person ordained or designated as a leader of the person's 
religious faith.  Code section 595.12 provides that the person authorized to solemnize the 
marriage may charge a reasonable fee for the marriage solemnization. 
Certificate of Marriage and Recording.  Code section 595.13 provides that after 
solemnization of the marriage, the person who solemnized the marriage is to attest to the 
marriage on the blank provided and is to return the certificate of marriage to the county 
registrar who issued the marriage license within 15 days of the marriage.  Under Code 
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section 144.36, the blank is to be signed by the person performing the ceremony as well as 
the witnesses to the ceremony. 
Under Code section 595.16A, once the original certificate of marriage is received by 
the county registrar, the county registrar is to issue a certified copy of the original certificate 
of marriage to the parties.  (Code section 144.16 provides for delayed registration of a 
marriage certificate, and Code section 144.36 provides for the recording of marriage 
certificates by the county registrar and for the filing of marriage certificates with the State 
Registrar.  This Code section also prohibits inclusion of information regarding the race, 
previous marriages or educational level of the parties in the certificate of marriage.  Code 
section 144.45 provides for certified copies of records and Code section 144.45A provides 
for the issuance of commemorative copies of certificates of marriage for a fee of $35, with 
the fees collected being used to support the development and enhancement of emergency 
medical services systems and emergency medical services for children.)  Code section 
595.17 provides that the provisions relating to the obtaining of a license and the 
solemnization of the marriage do not apply to members of a denomination having an 
unusual mode of entering into a marriage.  Under Code section 595.16, if a marriage is 
consummated without a cleric or magistrate, the return of the certificate of marriage may be 
made by either spouse to the county registrar. 
Legitimization and Validity.  Code section 595.18 provides that the subsequent 
marriage of the parents of children born outside of a marriage legitimizes the children and 
children who are born of a marriage which is otherwise void or for which granting of a 
license to marry is prohibited, are legitimate. 
Code section 595.19 specifies which marriages of persons related by blood are void, 
and provides that marriages between persons who have a living husband or wife are void, 
but if the parties live and cohabit together after the death of or divorce from the former 
husband or wife, the marriage is valid. 
With regard to marriages solemnized in another state, territory, country, or any foreign 
jurisdiction, Code section 595.20 provides that if the marriage was valid in that state, 
territory, country, or foreign jurisdiction, the marriage is valid in Iowa if the parties are a 
male and female and if the marriage would not otherwise be declared void. 
B. Recent Statutory and Judicial Actions Related to Marriage. 
1. Covenant Marriages. 
Covenant marriage proposals have been considered in a minimum of 20 states 
and three states, Louisiana (1997), Arkansas (1998), and Arizona (2001), have 
enacted covenant marriage laws.  Generally, covenant marriage provisions are an 
optional manner of entering into a marriage, require the couple to participate in 
premarital education, require counseling for problems during the marriage, provide for 
a longer waiting period prior to divorce, and specify certain exclusive grounds for 
divorce.134  Couples may enter into a covenant marriage originally, or may convert an 
existing marriage to a covenant marriage.  The grounds for divorce are similar in all 
three states.  For example, in Arizona, the grounds for divorce from a covenant 
marriage include commission of adultery, commission of a felony resulting in 
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sentencing to death or imprisonment, abandonment of the matrimonial domicile for at 
least one year before the filing of the petition for dissolution and refusal to return, 
physical or sexual abuse of the spouse or child, living separate and apart for at least 
two years prior to the filing of the petition for dissolution, living separate and apart for 
at least one year from the date of a decree for legal separation, habitual abuse of 
drugs or alcohol, or that the parties both agree to the dissolution.135  In the three states 
that provide for covenant marriages, 1 to 2 percent of the parties choose the covenant 
marriage option.136 
2. Defense of Marriage Acts and Constitutional Amendments. 
In May 1991, three same-sex couples filed a lawsuit against the state of Hawaii 
that challenged the refusal to issue a marriage license on the sole basis that the 
applicants were the same sex.  The trial court entered a judgment for the defendant, 
and the plaintiffs appealed.  On appeal to the Hawaii Supreme Court, the Supreme 
Court vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case.  The Supreme Court 
noted that although the plaintiffs did not have a fundamental constitutional right to 
same-sex marriage, under the Hawaii Constitution, Article I, section 5, the parties had 
a valid equal protection claim.  Hawaii's counterpart to the 14th Amendment under the 
United States Constitution, Article I, section 5, reads as follows: 
 [N]o person shall . . . be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be 
denied the enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against 
in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex, or ancestry. 
The Hawaii Supreme Court determined that for the purposes of an equal 
protection analysis under Article I, section 5, of the Hawaii Constitution, sex is a 
suspect category and because the statute discriminated on the basis of sex, the 
statute was subject to strict scrutiny.  The Hawaii Supreme Court therefore vacated the 
circuit court's order and judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings 
relative to the opinion.  In order for the state to be successful on remand, the state 
would have to prove a compelling state interest to uphold the statute.  The state lost 
on remand, failing to provide a compelling state interest to support the limitation of 
marriage based on sex, and the state appealed again to the Hawaii Supreme Court.137  
However, in 1997, the Hawaii legislature voted to place a constitutional amendment on 
the ballot in November 1998 to allow the state legislature to limit marriage to men and 
women only.  The constitutional amendment was adopted138 and in Baehr v. Miike,139 
the Hawaii Supreme Court dismissed the case on the grounds that constitutional 
challenge was moot due to adoption of the constitutional amendment. 
In the meantime, in 1996, Congress enacted the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA), which provides that for the purposes of federal laws, rulings, regulations, or 
interpretations of administrative bureaus and agencies, marriage is defined as 
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Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996), on remand to 1996 WL 694235 (Hawaii Cir. Ct. 1996), aff'd by Baehr v. Miike, 950 P.2d 
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between one man and one woman140 and also provided that a state did not have to 
recognize a same-sex marriage entered into in another state: 
 No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall 
be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of 
any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship 
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the 
laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim 
arising from such relationship.141 
Following the passage of the federal DOMA, many states enacted laws based on 
the federal law.  Currently 42 states have statutes defining marriage as between one 
man and one woman.142  These states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.  Some 
states, including Iowa, also provide a public policy exception to the recognition of 
marriages which do not comply with the requirement that marriage is between a man 
and a woman. 
Eighteen states have constitutional amendments defining marriage.143  These 
states are Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, and Utah.  Seven states do not define marriage either in statute or in their 
state constitution as being between a man and a woman.  These states are 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, and 
Wisconsin. 144 
3. Civil Unions. 
Two states currently provide for civil unions between same-sex parties by statute:  
Vermont (2000) and Connecticut (2005). Civil unions offer the same rights, benefits, 
and protections as marriage but only on the state level. 
Vermont.  The Vermont legislature enacted legislation in April 2000 to provide for 
civil unions between same-sex couples.  The legislation was the response of the 
legislature to the Vermont Supreme Court's ruling in Baker v. State.145  In Baker, three 
same-sex couples, all in relationships ranging in duration from four to 25 years, and 
two with children, applied for marriage licenses and were refused as ineligible under 
the state marriage laws.  In 1997, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the state of 
Vermont and their respective town clerks who were responsible for issuing marriage 
licenses, seeking a declaratory judgment that refusal to grant the marriage licenses 
was a violation of the marriage statutes and the Vermont Constitution.  The trial court 
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dismissed the complaint, ruled that the marriage statutes could not be construed to 
permit issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples, and also ruled that the 
marriage statute was constitutional because it rationally furthered the state's interest in 
"promoting 'the link between procreation and child rearing."'146 
The plaintiffs appealed, requesting injunctive and declaratory relief to secure a 
marriage license based on violation of the Vermont marriage statute and based on the 
statute being unconstitutional under the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont 
Constitution.  The Vermont Supreme Court, on appeal, in construing the marriage 
statute, rejected the claim that the plaintiffs were entitled to a marriage license under 
that statute.  However, in determining the constitutionality of the marriage statute, the 
Court distinguished the unique Common Benefits Clause, Chapter I, Article 7, of the 
Vermont Constitution with an inclusionary principle at its core and its more generous 
protection, from the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and what the Court viewed as its more rigid categories of analysis.  
The Court noted that "[t]he concept of equality at the core of the Common Benefits 
Clause was not the eradication of racial or class distinctions, but rather the elimination 
of artificial governmental preferments and advantages.  The Vermont Constitution 
would ensure that the law uniformly afforded every Vermonter its benefit, protection, 
and security so that social and political preeminence would reflect differences of 
capacity, disposition, and virtue, rather than governmental favor and privilege."147  
The Court reviewed the state's purposes in establishing a statutory classification 
which excluded same-sex couples from the benefits of marriage.  These interests 
related to promoting the link between procreation and child rearing, promoting security 
for children, and protecting the institution of marriage.  The Court concluded that none 
of these interests provided a reasonable and just basis for excluding same-sex 
couples from the benefits of the marriage law.  The Court cited the Common Benefits 
Clause of the Vermont Constitution, which in pertinent part, reads: 
 That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, 
protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for the 
particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of 
persons, who are a part only of that community . . . .148 
The Court held the following: 
 [P]laintiffs may not be deprived of the statutory benefits and protections 
afforded persons of the opposite sex who choose to marry.  We hold that 
the State is constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the 
common benefits and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont 
law.  Whether this ultimately takes the form of inclusion within the marriage 
laws themselves or a parallel "domestic partnership" system or some 
equivalent statutory alternative, rests with the Legislature.  Whatever system 
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is chosen, however, must conform with the constitutional imperative to 
afford all Vermonters the common benefit, protection, and security of law.149 
The Court did not grant the plaintiffs the relief they sought by providing injunctive 
and declaratory relief because the Court did not determine that the plaintiffs were 
entitled to a marriage license, but determined only that they were entitled to the 
common benefits and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law.  
Therefore, the Court allowed the current statutory scheme to remain in effect for a 
reasonable period of time, while the legislature enacted legislation to statutorily grant 
the benefits and protections constitutionally required.  However, the Court noted that if 
the benefits and protections were not statutorily granted, the plaintiffs could seek the 
relief originally sought.  The Court reversed the decision of the lower court, suspended 
the Court's decision, and retained jurisdiction to permit the legislature time to enact 
legislation consistent with the holding of the Court.150 
The legislature determined that instead of extending traditional marriage to same-
sex couples, it would provide for an alternative institution, civil unions.  The law was 
enacted in April 2000 and became effective July 1, 2000.151  By registering their civil 
unions, parties are able to receive  
 the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under Vermont law, 
whether they derive from statute, policy, administrative or court rule, 
common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a 
marriage.152 
The statute also provided for reciprocal beneficiary status to allow two people 
related by blood or adoption to qualify for certain specified benefits that would 
otherwise only be available to spouses.153 
Connecticut.  On April 20, 2005, the Connecticut legislature approved and the 
Governor signed legislation to provide for civil unions between same-sex parties in that 
state.  The legislation also provided that marriage is a union between one man and 
one woman and provided that civil unions are only available to parties 18 years of age 
or older.  The law took effect October 1, 2005.154 
4. Same-Sex Marriage. 
Massachusetts is the only state to recognize marriage between same-sex parties.  
In 2001, seven same-sex couples sued the Massachusetts Department of Public 
Health for denial of access to marriage licenses and exclusion from the legal and 
social status of marriage as well as the protections, benefits, and obligations of 
marriage as violative of Massachusetts law.  In May 2002, a Superior Court judge 
ruled in favor of the department, and the plaintiffs appealed.  In November 2003, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled in Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health 
that even though the existing statute could not be construed to permit same-sex 
                                            
149 Baker at 867. 
150 Id. at 886-89. 
151 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, ch. 23. 
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couples to marry, denying same-sex couples the protections, benefits, and obligations 
of marriage that were available to opposite-sex couples was unconstitutional on equal 
protection and due process grounds under the state constitution.  The Court noted that 
the commonwealth had failed to identify any constitutionally adequate reason for 
denying civil marriage to same-sex couples, dismissing the state's reasons, including  
furthering the state's interest in providing a favorable setting for procreation, ensuring 
the optimal setting for child rearing, and preserving scarce public or private resources.  
The Court also construed civil marriage to mean the voluntary union between two 
persons as spouses to the exclusion of all others.  The Court vacated the summary 
judgment for the department, remanded the case to the Superior Court for entry of a 
judgment consistent with the opinion, and stayed the judgment for 180 days (until May 
17, 2004) to allow the legislature to take appropriate action.155 
In December 2003, the Massachusetts Senate requested an advisory opinion 
from the Supreme Judicial Court to determine if a statute providing for civil unions 
would provide appropriate action.  The Supreme Judicial Court responded that the civil 
union provision was not the constitutional equivalent of marriage and would create a 
separate class of citizens, which would violate the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Massachusetts Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.156  The Massachusetts legislature then met in a constitutional convention and 
passed an amendment to the state constitution to establish civil unions but prohibit 
same-sex marriages.  The earliest that the amendment may be placed before the 
voters is November 2006.157  Based upon the ruling of the Court, the state of 
Massachusetts began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples beginning May 
17, 2004.  However, the state is enforcing its marriage evasion statute against out-of-
state same-sex couples.158 
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ALA. CODE tit. 30, ch. 1 
(2005) 
Yes.  Recognized in 
case law. 
Campbell v. Gullatt, 43 Ala. 57 
(1869); Piel v. Brown, 361 So. 
2d 90 (Ala.1978) 
Common law marriage 
elements:  a capacity to 
contract a marriage; a present, 
mutual agreement to 
permanently enter the 
marriage relationship to the 
exclusion of all other 
relationships; and public 
recognition of the relationship 
as a marriage and public 
assumption of marital duties 
and cohabitation. (See Boswell 
v. Boswell, 497 So. 2d 479, 
480 (Ala. 1986))  
 
Alaska ALASKA STAT. tit. 25, ch. 
05 (2004) 
No.  The 1917 statute 
was interpreted as 
mandatory, not 
directory. 
Edwards v. Franke, 364 P.2d 
60, 63 (Alaska 1961)  
ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.011(b) 
(2004)  
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
25, ch. 1 (West 2005) 
No.  Abrogated by 
statute in 1913. 
Levy v. Blakely, 18 P.2d 263, 
265 (Ariz. 1933) 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-
111 (West 2005) 
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. tit. 9, 
subtitle 2, ch. 11 (West 
2005) 
No.  Common law 
marriage never was a 
part of the law of the 




Furth v. Furth, 133 S.W. 1037, 
1038-39 (Ark. 1911) 
California CAL. FAM. CODE div. 3 
(West 2005) 




Norman v. Thomson, 54 P. 143 
(1898); Marvin v. Marvin, 557 
P.2d 106, 122 n.24 (Cal. 1976) 
CAL. FAM. CODE, div. 3, pt. 1, 
§ 300 (West 2005) 
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 14, art. 2, pt. 1 (West 
2005)  
Yes.  Recognized in 
case law. 
People v. Lucero, 747 P.2d 
660 (Colo. 1987) 
"[I]n this state a marriage 
simply by agreement of the 
parties, followed by 
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Common Law Marriage 
Authority 
cohabitation as husband and 
wife, and such other attendant 
circumstances as are 
necessary to constitute what is 
termed a 'common-law 
marriage,' may be valid and 
binding." Taylor v. Taylor, 50 P. 
1049 (Colo. App. 1897) 
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
ch. 815E (West 2005) 
No.  Not recognized. Gould v. Gould, 61 A. 604, 610 
(1905) (Hamersley, J., 
concurring) 
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, 
ch. 1 (2005) 
No.  Common law 
marriage not adopted 
in the state and 
statute interpreted as 
mandatory, not 
directory. 
Wilmington Trust Co. v. 
Hendrixson, 114 A. 215, 222 
(Del. Super. 1921); Owens v. 




D.C. CODE ANN. tit. 46, 
subt. I, ch. 4 (2005) 
Yes.  Recognized in 
case law. 
"So, whatever the rule may be 
elsewhere, in the District of 
Columbia it is that when a man 
and a woman who are legally 
capable of entering into the 
marriage relation mutually 
agree, in words of the present 
tense, to be husband and wife, 
and consummate their 
agreement by cohabiting as 
husband and wife, a common-
law marriage results." U.S. 
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. 
Britton, 269 F.2d 249, 251 
(C.A.D.C. 1959) 
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 741 
(West 2005) 
No.  Abrogated by 
statute effective 
January 1, 1968. 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.211 
(West 2005) 
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. tit. 19, ch. 
3 (West 2005) 
No.  Abrogated by 
statute effective 
January 1, 1997. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-1.1 
(West 2005) 
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 
div. 3, tit. 31, ch. 572 
(Matthew Bender 2004) 
No.  Statute 
interpreted as 
mandatory, not 
directory in 1920. 
Parke v. Parke, 25 Haw. 397 
(Haw. Terr. 1920) (part 5 of 
opinion) 
 
Idaho IDAHO CODE ANN. tit. 32, 
ch. 2-5 (2005) 
No.  Abrogated by 
statute effective 
January 1, 1996. 
IDAHO CODE § 32-201 (2005) 
Illinois 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. art 5, pts. II, III 
(2005) 
No.  Abrogated by 
statute effective June 
30, 1905. 
Lesher v. Lesher, 159 Ill. App. 
432 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1911), 
rev'd on other grounds, 250 Ill. 
382 N.E. 483 (Ill. 1911) 
Marriage Law 
 36




Common Law Marriage 
Authority 
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/214 (2005) 
 
Indiana IND. CODE ANN. tit. 31, 
art. 11 (2004) 
No.  Abrogated by 
statute effective 
January 1, 1958. 
In re Sutherland's Estate, 204 
N.E.2d 520 (Ind. 1965) 
IND. CODE 31-11-8-5 (2004) 
 
Iowa IOWA CODE ch. 595 
(2005) 
Yes.  Recognized in 
case law.  Penalty in 
statute for improper 
solemnization. 
The three elements that must 
exist to create a common law 
marriage in Iowa are: 
1.  Intent and agreement in 
praesenti to be married by both 
parties. 
2.  Continuous cohabitation. 
3.  Public declaration or 
holding out to the public that 
the parties are husband and 
wife. 
(See In re Estate of Fisher, 176 
N.W.2d 801, 805 (Iowa 1970) 
IOWA CODE § 595.11 (2005) 
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 23, 
art. I (2004) 
Yes.  Recognized in 
case law.  The statute 
limits recognition of 
common law 
marriages to parties 
18 years of age or 
older. 
To establish a common-law 
marriage, plaintiff must prove: 
(1) Capacity of the parties to 
marry, (2) a present marriage 
agreement, and (3) holding out 
of each other as husband and 
wife to the public.  Sullivan v. 
Sullivan, 413 P.2d 988, 992 
(Kan. 1966) 
State v. Walker, 13 P. 279, 
283-85 (Kan. 1887) 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101 
(2004) 
Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 
402 (West 2004) 
No.  Abrogated by 
statute in 1852. 
Harris v. Harris, 2 S.W. 549  
(Ky. App. 1887); Murphy v. 
Bowen, 756 S.W.2d 149, 150 
(Ky. App. 1988)  
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
402.020 (West 2004) 
Louisiana LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 
86-93 (2004) 
No.  Not recognized. Green v. Crowell, 69 F.2d 762, 
764 (5th Cir. 1934) 
Maine ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
19-A, pt. 2, ch. 23 (2005) 
No.  Not recognized. Pierce v. Secretary of U.S. 








Common Law Marriage 
Authority 
Welfare, 254 A.2d 46, 48 (Me. 
1969) 
Maryland MD. CODE ANN., FAM. 
LAW tit. 2 (West 2005) 




Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 207 (West 2005) 
No.  Not recognized. 
Never adopted as the 
common law, and 
statute interpreted as 
mandatory, not 
directory. 
The Inhabitants of the Town of 
Milford v. the Inhabitants of the 
Town of Worcester, 7 Mass. 48 
(1810); Commonwealth v. 
Munson, 127 Mass. 459, 466-
67 (1879) 
Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
ch 551 (West 2005) 
No.  Abrogated by 
statute effective 
January 1, 1957. 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
551.2 (West 2005) 
 
Minnesota MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 517 
(West 2005) 
No.  Abrogated by 
statute effective April 
26, 1941.  
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 
(West 2005) 
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. tit. 93, 
ch. 1 (West 2005) 
No.  Abrogated by 
statute effective April 
5, 1956. 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-15 
(West 2005) 
Missouri MO. ANN. STAT. tit. XXX, 
ch. 451 (West 2005) 
No.  Abrogated by 
statute effective 
March 31, 1921. 
State v. Eden, 169 S.W.2d 
342, 344-45 (Mo. 1943) 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 451.040 
(West 2005) 
Montana MONT. REV. CODE ANN. 
tit. 40, ch. 1 (2003) 
Yes.  Recognized 
today in statute. 
Montana also 
provides for 




MONT. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 26-1-602 (30); § 40-1-403; 
§ 40-1-311 
"[T]he party asserting that a 
common law marriage exists 
has the burden of proving:  (1) 
that the parties were 
competent to enter into a 
marriage; (2) that the parties 
assumed a marital relationship 
by mutual consent and 
agreement; and (3) that the 
parties confirmed their 
marriage by cohabitation and 
public repute." In re Estate of 
Hunsaker, 968 P.2d 281, 285 
(Mont. 1998) 
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. ch. 42, 
art. 1 (2005) 
No.  Abrogated by 
statute effective 1923. 
Collins v. Hoag & Rollins, Inc., 
241 N.W. 766, 767-69 (Neb. 
1932); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 
100 N.W. 930 (Neb. 1904) 
Marriage Law 
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Common Law Marriage 
Authority 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-104 
(2005) 
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
II, ch. 122 (West 2004) 
No.  Abrogated by 
statute effective 
March 29, 1943. 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
122.010 (West 2004) 
New 
Hampshire 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
XLIII, ch. 457 (2004) 
Yes, but recognized in 
statute only 
posthumously, after 
the death of one of 
the parties.  See N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 
457.39 (2004) and 
http://www.nhbar.org/ 
pdfs/7-02comlaw.pdf 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
457.39 (2004) 
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, ch. 
1 (West 2005) 
No.  Abrogated by 
statute effective 
December 1, 1939. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-10 
(West 2005) 
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 40, 
art. 1 (West 2005) 
No.  Not recognized.  
New Mexico Supreme 
Court held the statute 
of 1860 abolished 
common law marriage 
or that it was evidence 
that common law 
marriage had already 
been abolished. 
 
In re Gabaldon's Estate, 34 
P.2d 672, 673-75 (N.M. 1934) 
New York N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW ch. 
14, art. 1-3 (McKinney 
2005) 
No.  Effect of statute 
requiring 
solemnization was to 
abolish common law 
marriage effective 
April 29, 1933. 
Prior to this, common 
law marriage was 
abolished by statute 
from January 1, 1902, 
to January 1, 1908. 
In re Seymour, 185 N.Y.S. 373 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1920); Estate of 
Benjamin, 311 N.E.2d 495, 496 
(N.Y. 1974) 
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW ch. 14, 
art. 3, § 11 
North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 
51 (West 2005) 
No.  Not recognized. 
Statute interpreted to 
be mandatory, not 
directory. 
State v. Wilson, 23 S.E. 416, 
418 (N.C. 1897); State v. 
Samuel, 19 N.C. 177 (1836) 
(part 3 of opinion) 
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 14-
03 (2003) 
No.  Statute of 1890 
was interpreted to be 
mandatory, not 
directory. 
Schumacher v. Great N. Ry. 
Co., 136 N.W. 85, 86-87 (N.D. 
1912) 









Common Law Marriage 
Authority 
Ohio  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 
XXXI, ch 3101 (West 2005) 
No.  Abrogated by 
statute effective 
October 10, 1991. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
3105.12 (West 2005) 
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 
(West 2005) 
Yes.  Recognized in 
case law.  Statute 
interpreted to be 
directory, not 
mandatory. 
Reaves v. Reaves, 82 P. 490, 
492, 494, 496 (Okla. 1905) 
"A common law relationship is 
contractual, just as is a 
ceremonial marriage.  It must 
be founded upon a mutual 
agreement, to enter into a 
matrimonial relation, 
permanent and exclusive of all 
others, between parties 
capable of entering into such a 
contract; consummated by 
their cohabitation as man and 
wife as well as their open 
assumption of other marital 
duties." 178 P.2d 638, 640 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1947) 
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
II, ch. 106 (West 2003)  
No.  Not recognized.  
Statute interpreted to 
be mandatory. 
Huard v. McTeigh, 232 P. 658, 
662-63 (Or. 1925) 
Pennsylvania PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 
23, part II (West 2005) 
No.  Abrogated by 
statute effective 
January 1, 2005. 
Baker v. Mitchell, 17 A.2d 738, 
741 (Pa. Super. 1941)  
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, 
part II, § 1103 (West 2005) 
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS tit. 15, ch. 
1-3 (2004) 
Yes.   Recognized in 




Holgate v. United Electric Rys. 
Co., 133 A. 243, 244-45 (R.I. 
1926) 
"It can be established by clear 
and convincing evidence that 
the parties seriously intended 
to enter into the husband and 
wife relationship (citations 
omitted), and that their conduct 
was of such a character as to 
lead to the belief in the 
community that they were 
married (citations omitted).  
That there are the prerequisite 
serious intent and belief is 
demonstrable by inference 
from cohabitation, declarations, 
reputation among kindred and 
friends, and other competent 
circumstantial evidence." 
Sardonis v. Sardonis, 261 A.2d 








Common Law Marriage 
Authority 
South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 20, ch. 
1, art. 3 (2004) 
Yes.  Recognized in 




State v. Ward, 28 S.E.2d 785, 
786-87 (S.C. 1944) 
"It is essential to a common 
law marriage that there shall 
be a mutual agreement 
between the parties to assume 
toward each other the 
relationship of husband and 
wife.  Cohabitation without 
such an agreement does not 
constitute marriage." 
Johnson v. Johnson, 112 
S.E.2d 647, 651 (S.C. 1960) 
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ch. 
25-1 (2005) 
No.  Abrogated by 
statute effective July 
1, 1959. 
S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 25-
1-29 (2005) 
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 36, 
ch. 3 (West 2005) 
No.  Statute 
interpreted as 
mandatory.  However, 
courts do provide for 
estoppel to deny 
marriage. 
Bashaw v. State, 9 Tenn. 177 
(TENNERRAPPP 1829); 
Martin v. Coleman, 19 S.W.3d 
757, 760 (Tenn. 2000) 
Texas TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 
1, subt. A (Vernon 2005) 
Yes.  Recognized in 
statute as informal 
marriage. 
McChesney v. Johnson, 79 
S.W.2d 658, 659 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1934) 
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, 
subt. A, § 2.401-2.405 (Vernon 
2005) 
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 30, 
ch. 1 (West 2005) 
Yes.  Recognized in 
statute effective April 
27, 1987.  See Laws 
1982, c. 246, § 2 and 
David F. Crabtree, 
Recognition of 
Common-Law 
Marriage, 1988 Utah 
L. Rev. 273 n.1. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 
(West 2005) 
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, ch. 
1 (2003-2004)  
No.  Common law 
marriage never in 




Morrill v. Palmer, 33 A. 829, 
831 (Vt. 1895) 
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. tit. 20, chs 
2, 3 (West 2005) 
No.  Statute 
interpreted as 




Offield v. Davis, 40 S.E. 910, 
912-14 (Va. 1902) 
Marriage Law 
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Common Law Marriage 
Authority 
Washington WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
ch. 26.04 (West 2005) 
No.  Statute 
interpreted as 
mandatory.  
In re McLaughlin's Estate, 30 
P. 651, 658-59 (Wash. 1892)  
West Virginia W. VA. CODE ANN. ch. 48, 
art. 2 (West 2005) 
No.  Statute 
interpreted as 
mandatory. 
Beverlin v. Beverlin, 3 S.E. 36, 
39-40 (W. Va. 1887) 
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. ANN. ch. 765 
(West 2005) 
No.  Attorney general 
opinion that 1917 
statute was 
mandatory. 
In re Van Schaick's Estate, 40 
N.W.2d 588, 589 (Wis. 1949)  
Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, 
ch. 1, art. 1 (2005) 
No.  Statute 
interpreted as 
mandatory. 
In re Robert's Estate, 133 P.2d 
492, 498-503 (Wyo. 1943) 
 
Iowa Legislative Services Agency 
www.legis.state.ia.us/Central/Guides/ 
0504-1RR 
